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IPO LIABILITY AND ENTREPRENEURIAL RESPONSE 
JAMES C. SPINDLER†  
This Article explores how legal liability in the IPO context can affect an en-
trepreneur’s decision of whether and how to take a firm public.  Liability under 
the Securities Act of 1933 effectively embeds a put option in an IPO security, 
forcing the entrepreneur to insure shareholders against poor firm performance, 
inflating the price of the security, and exposing the entrepreneur to risk.  This 
may cause IPO firms to appear to underperform relative to non-IPO firms as 
the option value decays, and may lead the entrepreneur to undertake strategic 
(but destructive) responses to minimize the put value and his exposure to risk.  
Because of the value-destroying characteristics of these responses—which in-
clude initial underpricing, entrenchment, lower net present value projects, asset 
partitioning, and reduced disclosure—the present state of affairs is inefficient 
compared to a system where the entrepreneur can simply allocate the risk to 
shareholders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mandatory disclosure rules are often perceived as a no-lose quick 
fix.  After all, what’s the harm in simply requiring one party to a trans-
action to give information already in her possession to another party?  
Such a requirement appears to promote fairness with little, if any, 
overall social cost, and, based largely on this premise, disclosure rules 
are a popular choice among academics and legislators.  But there is a 
fallacy here:  information is costly to obtain, and certainty may be im-
possible to achieve.  There are thus hidden costs to disclosure rules:  
when information is incomplete or uncertain, the party burdened 
with making accurate disclosure is made to bear the risk that those 
disclosures will prove incorrect.  Bearing that risk may well affect the 
party’s substantive behavior in socially undesirable ways. 
Such a situation arises in the securities context, which is the focus 
of this Article.  Sellers of securities—such as founding entrepre-
neurs—are required under the Securities Act of 1933 to make full and 
complete disclosure to purchasing investors (the public shareholders) 
in public offerings.1  As I will show, the imposition of this disclosure 
requirement apportions risk in a way that the parties to the transac-
tion—the shareholder and the entrepreneur—likely find suboptimal, 
and this distorts their incentives in undesirable ways. 
To begin with the basic framework, consider the stylized “bargain-
ing” that takes place between a selling entrepreneur and purchasing 
shareholders.  When an entrepreneur who has founded a firm and 
developed its business decides to take it public in an initial public of-
fering (IPO), he gets to choose many things about the firm’s initial 
setup.  For instance, he may decide to embed takeover protection in 
1 Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2000).  Throughout, the Se-
curities Act of 1933 will be referred to simply as the “Securities Act.” 
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the firm’s charter, retain voting control and issue only nonvoting 
stock, or partition the firm’s assets and sell only a part thereof to the 
public shareholders.  These choices are subject to the shareholder’s 
valuation of the resulting structure:  a shareholder will be willing to 
pay more or less for the firm’s shares depending on whether she finds 
the entrepreneur’s choices agreeable.  With this ability to “bargain,” 
in general we expect to see the selling entrepreneur and purchasing 
shareholders reach efficient outcomes in the structure and form of 
the firm and the firm’s IPO. 
One such area of bargaining between entrepreneur and share-
holder involves the assignment of risk.  Because the entrepreneur 
lacks the ability to diversify away idiosyncratic risk, while the share-
holder can diversify completely, the firm is actually worth more in the 
hands of the shareholder than it is in the hands of the entrepreneur.2  
Thus, when the entrepreneur sells a share of the firm to the share-
holder, one basic area of agreement between the two is that the 
shareholder will bear the risk on the shares that she purchases.  This is 
perhaps such an obvious concept as to appear almost trivial:  we sup-
pose that when a shareholder purchases shares of, say, IBM on the 
open market, the shareholder is fully aware that she bears the risk of a 
decline in the value of those shares. 
The argument of this Article, however, is that the U.S. securities 
laws do not allow this simple risk-sharing bargain to be struck in the 
IPO context,3 with negative consequences for shareholder and entre-
preneur alike.  The reason is that the material misstatement or omis-
2 “Idiosyncratic,” “unique,” “firm-specific,” or “diversifiable” risk is risk that is par-
ticular to that specific firm, whereas “systemic” or “market” risk is risk present in the 
market generally.  See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPO-
RATE FINANCE 168 (7th ed. 2003) (distinguishing between “unique risk” and “market 
risk”).  For example, a gold mining firm has idiosyncratic risk in that its properties may 
or may not contain any gold; it also has systemic risk in that the market price of gold 
may rise or fall (this risk is systemic because it derives from economy-wide factors that 
affect all firms in the industry).  Because idiosyncratic risks among many firms should, 
by definition, tend to cancel one another out, an investor holding a diverse portfolio 
of securities escapes much exposure to idiosyncratic risk.  See, for example, Wisconsin 
Real Estate Investment Trust v. Weinstein, 781 F.2d 589, 598 (7th Cir. 1986), for a discus-
sion by Judge Frank Easterbrook of shareholder diversification. 
3 While “seasoned” issuers—those that are already public companies—are also 
subject to Securities Act liability for the public sale of securities, the rules that apply to 
them are somewhat different, and much more limited in practical application, than 
the rules that apply to IPO firms.  See infra notes 26, 63, and accompanying text (de-
scribing the greater level of protection that seasoned issuers enjoy for forward-looking 
statements). 
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sion liability standard of section 11 of the Securities Act4 effectively 
grants the shareholder the right to “put” back the shares to the entre-
preneur for their purchase price in the bad state of the world in which 
the firm performs poorly.5  The shareholder relies on information 
provided by the entrepreneur—including the entrepreneur’s expecta-
tions about future performance—to make her purchase decision, and 
if, in hindsight, this information appears to have been wrong, the 
shareholder has the legal right to recover her losses from the firm, 
wiping out the entrepreneur’s stake.  The entrepreneur ends up bear-
ing idiosyncratic risk that could be more efficiently borne by the 
shareholder.  There are two principal implications of this risk alloca-
tion. 
First, because the shareholder purchases not just the firm’s equity 
but also a “put option” exercisable in the bad state of the world, the 
shareholder pays more for the share-cum-option than she would have 
paid for just the share.  This means that the firm initially appears to be 
valued in excess of the net present value of its future cash flows, and, 
over time, as the value of the option component of the security de-
clines, the firm will tend to appear to underperform relative to non-
IPO firms.  This relative underperformance is exacerbated when the 
shareholder exercises her put option in the bad state of the world, 
pulling assets out of the firm.  Underperformance of IPO firms, which 
has sometimes been held up as evidence of market inefficiency, may 
in fact be an artifact of regulatory distortion. 
Second, and more importantly, because this allocation of risk is 
undesirable to the entrepreneur, the entrepreneur may undertake a 
number of strategic responses to attempt to minimize her exposure to 
the firm’s idiosyncratic risk.  These actions could involve initial un-
derpricing of the IPO, managerial entrenchment, choosing lower 
value (but safer) business projects, investing in insurance or hedging 
transactions, partitioning of assets, refraining from disclosing positive 
information about the firm in the IPO prospectus, or firm-level diver-
sification (“empire building”).  Most of these activities have the poten-
tial to destroy value and lead to outcomes that are inefficient com-
4 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000). 
5 A “put” or “put option” is the right to sell a security at a specified price (the 
“strike” or “exercise” price).  For example, if an investor “exercises” a put option with a 
strike price of $30 when the price of the security has dropped to $10, the investor’s 
counterparty is forced to pay $30 to the investor.  The put here, at the moment of ex-
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pared to allowing the entrepreneur and shareholder to allocate risk 
between them as they choose. 
I.  A NOTE ON THIS ARTICLE’S CONTRIBUTION  
TO THE LITERATURE 
The chief aim of this Article is to describe the effect that securities 
liability has on the incentives of the entrepreneur and the firm from 
an ex ante perspective, providing a linkage between the public capital-
raising process and the nature and structure of the public firms that 
result.  This is something on which relatively little has been written.  
While some have argued in very general terms that overly harsh liabil-
ity or an overly litigious environment may keep issuers from the public 
markets in favor of, inter alia, private or offshore deals,6 those authors 
do not consider the entrepreneur’s broad range of dynamic responses 
to the threat of litigation.  This Article fills that gap, and concludes 
that these responses are themselves potentially quite harmful. 
More broadly, this Article bears upon the merits of the Securities 
Act itself and, in doing so, weighs in on a question the legal literature 
has widely discussed:  whether mandatory disclosure laws are justi-
fied.7  While this Article does not discuss the potential costs and bene-
fits8 of a private-ordering system of disclosure, instead taking the 
6 See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?  A Study of Settlements in Se-
curities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 571-72 (1991) (describing behaviors induced 
by the threat of litigation). 
7 According to the traditional position, securities laws serve to protect investors, 
who are plagued by bounded rationality at the individual or even market level.  For 
modern incarnations of this view, see, for example, Robert Prentice, Whither Securities 
Regulation?  Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 
1397, 1413-17, 1454-56 (2002) (describing bounds on rational decision making by in-
vestors), and Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency:  An Introduction to the 
New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 636-67 (2003) (questioning the “efficient capital mar-
ket hypothesis”).  In opposition, market-oriented scholars have argued that a system of 
private ordering, or at least regulatory competition, is preferable to mandatory federal 
regulation.  For instance, Roberta Romano argues that securities regulation should be 
devolved to the states, Paul Mahoney argues that securities regulation should be de-
volved to the exchanges, and Stephen Choi argues that securities regulation should be 
devolved to private parties (though he would require the licensing of investors).  
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors:  A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 
YALE L.J. 2359, 2361-62 (1998); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1453, 1453-55 (1997); Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers:  A Market-
Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279, 281-83 (2000). 
8 A somewhat less developed, though interesting, line of argument has taken the 
position that mandatory disclosure schemes may have a place even in rational and effi-
cient markets if there are network effects from uniform regulation or significant ex-
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mandatory disclosure regime as given, it does elaborate upon the costs 
that a one-size-fits-all system of mandatory disclosure and risk shifting 
can impose upon issuing firms and shareholders.  A description of 
these costs, including the strategic maneuvers by the entrepreneur to 
affect the firm’s structure or capitalization, forms the bulk of this Arti-
cle, to be found in Parts III and IV. 
This Article also considers the issue of how, exactly, current liabil-
ity rules function.  This inquiry bears on a major question the litera-
ture has addressed:  whether the litigation mechanism for imposing 
securities liability is “broken.”  This literature, which developed 
around Janet Cooper Alexander’s seminal 1991 article, argues posi-
tively that the underlying existence of fraud or material inaccuracy 
appears uncorrelated with settlement outcomes.9  The so-called “strike 
ternalities from issuer disclosure.  Judge Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, for instance, 
discuss the public goods aspect of disclosure:  were disclosure an opt-in affair, issuing 
firms would rationally choose to free ride on the disclosure of others.  FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
286-90 (1991).  John Coates takes a somewhat different tack in proposing that manda-
tory disclosure requirements, in their present form, prevent a future political backlash 
against public corporations and securities firms.  John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political 
Choice of Securities Regulation:  A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 533-
35 (2001).  Allen Ferrell suggests that established firms may, in the absence of a man-
datory disclosure regime, intentionally disclose less in order to raise the cost of capital 
for potential market-entrant competitors, who would be able to free ride off this dis-
closure.  Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around the 
World 6-8 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Pa-
per No. 492, 2004), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ 
papers/pdf/Ferrell_492.pdf. 
9 See Alexander, supra note 6, at 571 (“[C]osts [of litigation] do not depend on 
proof of wrongdoing but flow from the simple fact of a sufficiently large decline in the 
stock price.”).  While the statistical significance of the findings from Alexander’s data 
is questionable, subsequent empirical work has largely backed up her claims.  In re-
sponse to Alexander, Joel Seligman argues that price drops alone do not lead to suit 
and settlement.  Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
438, 444-45 (1994) (noting that cases in which the only evidence of wrongdoing is a 
price drop are generally dismissed).  For more recent empirical work on this question, 
generally supporting the hypothesis that securities class actions are often without 
merit, see James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market:  Empirical Evi-
dence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 979-82 (1996); Michael A. 
Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 976-
77; and Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions 69-72 (Univ. of Cal. at 
Berkeley Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, 2004), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=528145. 
   My argument, which is orthogonal to these two opposing arguments, is that a suf-
ficiently large decline in share price is, in fact, “proof of wrongdoing” (to use Alexan-
der’s term), because a finder of fact can infer incorrect disclosure from the price ad-
justment. 
  
2007] IPO LIABILITY AND ENTREPRENEURIAL RESPONSE 1193 
 
suit,” where a decline in share price, by itself, leads to significant set-
tlement amounts, is ostensibly evidence of brokenness.10  I argue, in 
contrast, that, from a Bayesian point of view, a decline in share price 
should be a major factor in deciding whether inaccurate disclosure oc-
curred, and in some cases could be the only factor necessary to sup-
port a presumption of inaccuracy.  Whatever the merits or demerits of 
section 11, settlements based on share price declines are consistent 
with a proper, statistically informed interpretation of section 11.  I ex-
plore this point in Part II of this Article. 
Along the way, I revisit a puzzle that has caused much ink to be 
spilt in the finance literature:  long-term underperformance of IPO 
firms.11  I posit that long-term underperformance could, in fact, be an 
artifact of regulation, rather than evidence of dysfunctionality in the 
capital markets; put quite simply, the imposition of Securities Act li-
ability shifts risk from shareholders to the entrepreneur, for which the 
entrepreneur must be compensated in the form of an artificially high 
price for the shares.  There has been some, though not much, pre-
liminary work along these lines, upon which my discussion builds.12  
10 For example, Bohn and Choi have used instrumentalities of material misstate-
ments to test whether securities actions are meritorious.  Bohn & Choi, supra note 9, at 
924-26.  But not everyone has agreed that the strike suit phenomenon exists.  See, e.g., 
Seligman, supra note 9, at 442-44 (attacking the claim that firms are sued whenever 
their stock drops).  Part of the problem has been that data on settlements are hard to 
come by, since no opinions are filed, no judgments entered, and the amounts of set-
tlements are difficult to measure.  The current wisdom, however, seems to be that 
some degree of meritless litigation persists even after litigation reforms such as the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  See Choi, supra note 9, at 69-71 (de-
scribing potential adverse effects of the PSLRA); Perino, supra note 9, at 976-77 (find-
ing that the PSLRA did not reduce meritless litigation with respect to some issuers). 
11 “Underperformance” is calculated using the long-term performance as meas-
ured from the close of the first day’s trading.  Measuring from the first day’s close is 
done because the closing price should represent the fair market value of the issuing 
firm based upon all publicly available information.  See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 2, 
at 419 (noting that “underperformance is an exception to the efficient-market the-
ory”).  This phenomenon was first documented in Jay R. Ritter, The Long-Run Perform-
ance of Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 3, 23-24 (1991). 
12 Alexander discusses a “litigation put” that acts as insurance against market 
losses, though she dismisses the possibility of significant effects upon price.  See Janet 
Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
1421, 1447 (1994) (considering the “theoretical plausibility” of an embedded litigation 
put, but concluding that it likely would be of “negligible value”).  Alexander uses the 
put, instead, to analyze whether securities damages are measured accurately.  See id. at 
1452 (“To the extent that the . . . termination of the litigation put affect[s] the share 
price, [the current system of measuring damages] systematically overstates the amount 
of damages.”). 
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New data make this issue well worth picking up again:  studies con-
ducted over the last decade suggest that the magnitude of underper-
formance is not as great as once thought,13 while the incidence of se-
curities litigation is significantly higher than was previously believed, 
especially under certain conditions and for certain firms.14  Part III.D 
puts forth a simple method for estimating the magnitude of this ef-
fect, and finds that the liability data are consistent with observed un-
derperformance. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  In Part II, I provide a description 
of IPO liability under the Securities Act and explain how application 
of the Act’s liability provisions embeds a put option in a firm’s publicly 
offered securities.  In Part III, I discuss observed trends in IPO price 
performance, develop a simple model of how the embedded put af-
fects stock price over time, use existing empirical studies to calibrate 
the model, and find that the magnitude of the embedded-option ef-
fect is consistent with findings of long-term underperformance among 
IPO firms.  In Part IV, I describe how the entrepreneur may strategi-
cally alter the firm’s capital structure, investment activity, or other at-
tributes in order to minimize idiosyncratic risk, and I also examine the 
inefficiencies generated by these strategic maneuvers.  Part V briefly 
concludes. 
II.  EMBEDDING PUT OPTIONS THROUGH DISCLOSURE LIABILITY 
A.  Liability for Inaccurate Disclosure 
The standard for liability in a public offering of securities is set by 
section 11 of the Securities Act, which provides that an issuing firm 
(along with, subject to a due diligence defense, the underwriter and 
the issuer’s directors and officers) is strictly liable for any material 
   Similarly, Patricia Hughes and Anjan Thakor point out that litigation avoidance 
theories of initial underpricing can be theoretically consistent with observed long-term 
underperformance, but they then leave the matter at that.  Patricia J. Hughes & Anjan 
V. Thakor, Litigation Risk, Intermediation, and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 5 
REV. FIN. STUD. 709, 735-36 (1992). 
13 See Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57 J. 
FIN. 1795, 1817-21 (2002) (reviewing the evidence of underperformance). 
14 See, e.g., Bohn & Choi, supra note 9, at 979-81 (describing different rates of suit 
and settlement for different strata of firms); Perino, supra note 9, at 932 (finding that 
“virtually every issuer that went public at the end of the Internet offering boom has 
been sued”). 
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misstatements or omissions in a registration statement or prospectus.15  
The measure of damages if the plaintiff shows a material misstatement 
or omission is the initial offering price of the securities less the price 
at the time of suit.16  A misstatement or omission is deemed “material” 
if a reasonable investor would have considered it important to her in-
vestment decision—in short, if investors should care about it, it is ma-
terial.17  Looking at markets as a whole, then, any information that af-
fects the price of a security is material, since a change in price means 
that investors are changing their investment decisions.18
Because little, if any, prior information is available about an IPO 
firm, investors are dependent upon such a firm to provide informa-
tion about itself.19  The Securities Act maintains strict control over the 
15 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000).  In addition to specifically mandated disclosures, Rule 
408 of the Securities Act requires issuing firms to disclose in a prospectus “such further 
material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in 
the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.”  17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.408(a) (2006). 
16 Securities Act of 1933 § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2000).  This is, however, sub-
ject to an affirmative defense:  if the defendant firm can prove that some portion of 
the decline in price resulted from factors other than the firm’s inaccurate disclosure, 
the firm can escape liability for that portion of the decline.  Id.  There are alternative 
forms of damage calculations under section 11(e) in the event that the shareholder 
has sold prior to suit, or enjoys an appreciation in value post-suit, id., but these do not 
affect the analysis that follows. 
17 The concept of “materiality” is defined by Rule 405 of the Securities Act, which 
states that “the [t]erm ‘material’ . . . [refers] to those matters to which there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining 
whether to purchase the security.”  17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2006); see also Paul Vizcar-
rondo, Jr. & Andrew C. Houston, Liabilities Under Sections 11, 12, 15 and 17 of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and Sections 10, 18 and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in UNDER-
STANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 1067, 1075-76 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course 
Handbook Series No. B-1385, 2003) (“The leading case on materiality is TSC Industries, 
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), which defined a material fact as one to 
which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach impor-
tance in making a decision because the fact would significantly alter the ‘total mix’ of 
available information.”). 
18 This type of standard has been adopted in other securities litigation contexts as 
well.  For example, courts have recognized the “fraud on the market” doctrine, accord-
ing to which movements in the market price of a security are adequate to prove reli-
ance in a fraudulent disclosure claim under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).  See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 
(9th Cir. 1975) (noting that a purchaser “relies generally on the supposition that the 
market price is validly set”). 
19 Section 5 of the Securities Act makes it illegal to sell or offer securities prior to 
the filing of a registration statement with the SEC.  15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2000).  “Offer” 
is defined broadly under section 2 of the Securities Act to include virtually any infor-
mation released by the issuer or its agents with a view toward encouraging investors to 
purchase the issuer’s securities.  Id. § 77b(a)(3); see also Guidelines for Release of In-
